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Retaining 
legitimacy in 
fragile states
Globalisation, liberalisation, and the withdrawal 
of external support from Cold War alliances 
have placed enormous strains on some 
developing countries – best described as ‘fragile 
states’. These are states with high levels of 
poverty and inequality and low levels of state 
capacity. They are particularly vulnerable to 
internal and external shocks as well as domestic 
and international conflict. 
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International attention is focusing 
more and more on fragile states as 
sites of potential violence and warfare. 
State fragility can lead to devastating 
humanitarian crises: 3.9 million people 
died in the war in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo between 1998 and 2004 for 
example; at least 200,000 people have 
died in the current conflict in Darfur 
whilst as many as two million have been 
displaced.
Fragile states are also seen as potential 
sites of terrorist activity – as in Afghanistan 
under Taliban rule where the self-
proclaimed perpetrators of the attack 
against the World Trade Centre on 11th 
September 2001 found refuge and a base 
for their activities.
Yet many fragile states have managed to 
avoid political violence and state collapse. 
In countries like Tanzania or Zambia, for 
instance, despite deeply rooted poverty 
and repeated economic crises, political 
authority has remained intact and conflict 
has largely been managed peacefully. 
This issue of id21 insights explores 
different dimensions of state fragility, 
sources of political legitimacy and strategic 
considerations for the donor community. 
How can interventions in fragile states 
contribute effectively to securing peace 
and development?
Defining political legitimacy
A state enjoys political legitimacy when the 
people over whom the state exercises its 
and a state’s legitimacy is challenged, 
non-economic factors can become an 
important basis to challenge or defend 
state legitimacy, including:
l ensuring order and security in society 
in the face of all sorts of threats (as 
in Indonesia during the early years of 
Suharto)
l defending the integrity of the nation 
(Nigeria under Olusegan Obasanjo)
l promoting a particular ethnic agenda 
(as in Kenya under Daniel Arap Moi) 
or a non-ethnic one (Tanzania under 
Julius Nyerere)
authority accept ‘its right to rule’. In order 
to manage the conflicts within a society 
peacefully, a state needs (at least) passive 
acceptance of its right to rule by the 
majority of people. The state also requires 
the active support of the most powerful 
people – those who command economic 
and political power, like big businesses, 
large property owners, major religious 
leaders or regional power brokers. 
Even non-democratic regimes need 
to achieve a degree of legitimacy 
to survive over time. In Indonesia, 
the Suharto regime (1967 to 1998) 
achieved significant legitimacy for many 
years despite its military origins and 
authoritarian character. This was done by 
ensuring the basic delivery of education 
and health services, and paying attention 
to rural development. Once those close 
to President Suharto started to pay more 
attention to personal enrichment than 
national development, the regime began 
to unravel through processes described by 
Graham Brown.
Alternative sources of legitimacy
In a basic way, legitimacy is determined 
by a state’s performance – the extent to 
which those who control public authority 
deliver what they promise. This is 
grounded mainly in the economic sphere, 
but alternative sources of legitimacy exist. 
Fragile states, by definition, are particularly 
susceptible to legitimacy challenges. 
When economic performance is poor 
t
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Sudanese refugees at Iridimi refugee camp near Iriba in Chad. They fled their 
homes after being attacked by Janjaweed militias. At least 200,000 people 
have died in the current conflict in Darfur whilst as many as two million 
have been displaced. A 60-day ceasefire was agreed on January 10th 2007 
including the beginning of a new round of diplomacy involving Sudan, rebel 
leaders, the African Union, United Nations and other countries. 
Sven Torfinn/Panos Pictures 2004
2l defending or challenging (often 
invented) tradition (at different 
moments in Congo/Zaire Mobutu 
sought legitimacy in challenging or 
defending traditional authority)
l promoting reforms that increase 
participation (as in Bolivia under Evo 
Morales) or perhaps decrease it (as in 
Chile under Augusto Pinochet).
Democratic rules not necessarily a 
source of legitimacy
There is a tendency in the international 
community to see the introduction of 
competitive politics – the holding of an 
election or the passage of a democratic 
constitution – as a means to ensuring the 
legitimacy of a state in reconstruction. But 
many long standing ‘democratic’ regimes 
in Latin America, or those set up in the 
wake of independence in Africa or Asia, 
have been easily deposed by authoritarian 
regimes. These democracies failed to deliver 
meaningful economic change, or presided 
over highly unequal societies, or simply 
could not ensure basic security. 
Despite prolonged economic crisis, the 
state in Tanzania maintained stability and 
peace largely due to the legitimacy of 
its leading party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
(CCM). Despite presiding over a one-party 
state, CCM maintained the state’s presence 
often down to the village level: there was 
a real sense that the state acted in the 
interests of poor people. The military coup 
in Pakistan that brought General Musharraf 
to power was welcomed by the population 
given the failure of the former democratic 
regime to deliver development or security; 
the declaration of emergency rule in 
Bangladesh in January 2007 was met with 
considerable popular support for similar 
reasons. 
t
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Jack Snyder and Edward Mansfield 
warn of over-estimating the potential of 
democratic processes to secure peace 
in post-war countries. A hasty move to 
introduce electoral politics or democratic 
rules in the wake of war may only lead to 
further violence and democratic failure. 
It may first be necessary to establish or 
strengthen state administration, a fair legal 
system or secure an open media. Holding 
elections in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo without making significant progress 
in establishing integrated armed forces 
and effective policing or in delivering 
economic opportunities to an impoverished 
population has not removed the sources of 
violence.
Reconstructing legitimacy in the wake 
of war and state collapse
After the end of war, establishing a 
functioning state that can deliver security, 
enable a revival of productive economic 
activity and ensure a degree of fairness is 
crucial. 
Establishing security is probably the single 
most important way to win legitimacy for a 
state after prolonged violence. Deepayan 
Basu Ray and Richard Jolly argue that to 
be effective, a state needs to be guided by 
a notion of ‘human security’ that addresses 
political, economic and social sources of 
insecurity along with threats to physical 
security. 
A second priority is the need to establish 
a basic capacity for taxation – a highly 
political task rather than a simple technical 
challenge, as Jonathan Di John explains. 
A taxation system is essential for any long-
term delivery of services including security; 
it also needs to be perceived as fair. 
States need to manage conflict and the 
character of judicial processes is central to 
long-term legitimacy. Clarence Dias argues 
that this involves establishing the rule of 
law as well as providing access to justice 
through participatory mechanisms. Tobias 
Debiel and Conrad Schetter further 
argue that judicial and government systems 
Interventions by the international 
community
As international donor agencies and 
non-government organisations attempt 
to intervene in fragile states, they 
need to reject simplistic solutions and 
design appropriate policies that fit local 
realities. David Malone argues that the 
international community needs to pay 
far more attention to preventing conflict 
before it erupts. When conflict does flare 
up, interventions often do not have the 
long-term commitment necessary to make 
a difference. 
Every intervention needs to be judged 
in terms of its effects on the consolidation 
of a legitimate public authority. This may 
mean departing from standard formulas of 
economic management or political design.
James Putzel
Crisis States Research Centre, London School of 
Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE 
j.putzel@lse.ac.uk
See also
Economic and Political Foundations of State-making in 
Africa: Understanding State Reconstruction, Working 
Paper 3, Crisis States Research Centre, London School 
of Economics, by Gabi Hesselbein, Frederick Golooba-
Mutebi and James Putzel, 2006
War, State Collapse and Reconstruction: Phase 2 of the 
Crisis States Programme, Working Paper 1(2), Crisis 
States Research Centre, London School of Economics by 
James Putzel, 2005
From Voting to Violence: Democratization and 
Nationalist Conflict, London: W.W. Norton, by Jack 
Snyder, 2000
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Holding elections in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo without making 
significant progress in establishing 
integrated armed forces and effective 
policing or in delivering economic 
opportunities to an impoverished 
population has not removed the 
sources of violence
need to be based on indigenous and often 
traditional norms if the state is to secure 
effective legitimacy at the local level.
The international community 
needs to pay far more attention 
to preventing conflict before it 
erupts. When conflict does flare up, 
interventions often do not have the 
long-term commitment necessary 
to make a difference 
Transitional government soldiers patrolling the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia, two weeks after they 
recaptured the city. Backed by the Ethiopian military, transitional government troops quickly took 
territory previously held by the Union of Islamic Courts. Sven Torfinn/Panos Pictures 2007
democratisation provides particularly 
fertile ground for nationalist and sectarian 
agendas. Threatened elites sometimes use 
nationalist, ethnic, or religious messages 
to create fear and gain a mass following. 
Ethnic or cultural groups are the easiest to 
mobilise when governance institutions that 
reach beyond traditional cultural groupings 
are poorly developed. 
Outside powers can promote premature 
democratisation in a country lacking the 
organisational capacity to conduct open, 
competitive politics. This can increase 
the risk of violence, as Burundi in 1993 
showed. Outsiders need to make sure that 
their well-intentioned efforts do no harm. 
One solution is to promote democracy in 
the right sequence: state building first, then 
free and fair elections.
l First, strengthen 
the organisations of 
state administration. 
If there is no state, 
elections to decide 
who runs the state 
are meaningless.
l Second, support a 
political coalition 
that believes 
it will benefit 
from governing 
impartially and 
sticking to rules.
l Third, help the 
coalition to stop 
corruption, create 
honest courts, and 
allow professional, 
objective journalists 
to start practicing 
their profession.
Once these building blocks are in place, 
free and fair elections can lead to 
good results, and violence is less likely. 
Successful recent democratic transitions 
in South America, Eastern Europe, 
Korea, Taiwan, and South Africa have 
had many preconditions of democracy 
in place before the voting started. 
Violent transitions in the Middle East, the 
Balkans, and elsewhere have not.
Jack Snyder
School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia 
University, New York, USA
T +1 212 854 8290     jls6@columbia.edu
Edward D. Mansfield
Department of Political Science, University of 
Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania, USA
T +1 215 898 7657    emansfie@sas.upenn.edu
See also
Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go 
to War, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, by 
Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, 2005
‘Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, 
Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992’, 
American Political Science Review 95(1), pages 33-
48, by Havard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, 
and Nils Peter Gleditsch, 2001
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Risking civil war by 
promoting democracy 
Promoting democracy abroad may seem like a good 
way to promote peace. Mature, stable democracies have 
not fought wars against each other, and they rarely 
experience civil wars. But the path to a democratic peace 
is not always smooth.
Democratic transitions attempted 
recently in Lebanon, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and the Palestinian 
Authority have been very violent. 
Elections in Algeria, Burundi, and 
Yugoslavia in the 1990s also led 
directly to major civil wars.
States unable to complete 
transitions to democracy are 
more likely to become involved 
in international and civil wars 
(see graph below). In some cases, 
elections are a sideshow during 
struggles for political control. 
This is particularly so in states 
with weak political organisations 
and institutions. In other cases 
however, the democratisation 
process itself has created the 
conflict.
The most fundamental cause of war 
in transitional states is the gap between 
demands for political participation and 
the political institutions and organisations 
necessary to meet those demands.
When authoritarian or colonial regimes 
break down, elite factions and popular 
groups often struggle for power. This 
occurs when repressive state authority has 
weakened and democratic institutions and 
organisations are not sufficiently developed 
to take its place. These conditions can lead 
to civil war since there are no institutional 
means to address grievances or concerns.
Civil war can also occur when 
governments are unable to appease or 
suppress the rise of mass ethnic, sectarian, 
or class-based movements. Incomplete 
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In the small village of Jabal-o 
Saraj in Afghanistan, a candidates' 
list exclusively for women (left), 
and men queuing to vote outside 
the polling station (above). Amid 
accusations of serious flaws in the 
democratic process, Afghanistan 
held its first ever presidential 
election on the 9th October 2004. 
Jeroen Oerlemans/Panos Pictures
Note: The height of each bar is determined by the ratio of the likelihood of a 
civil war for a given type of regime change to the likelihood of a civil war for 
a state that is not undergoing a regime change. These probabilities are derived 
from our statistical model of civil war.
The most fundamental cause of 
war in transitional states is the 
gap between demands for political 
participation and the existence 
of political institutions and 
organisations necessary to meet 
those demands.
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Bridging security and development
People-centred approaches needed
During the disarmament and demobilisation 
process in Monrovia, Liberia, a former child 
soldier hands in ammunition to a United Nations 
peacekeeping soldier. The UN peacekeeping force 
in Liberia began to disarm former President Charles 
Taylor’s militias in December 2003. The beginning 
of the disarmament was marked by riots, leading 
to a suspension of the programme until April 
2004. But soldiers and child soldiers came in their 
thousands to the disarmament camps on the 
outskirts of Monrovia. By the end of the process in 
December 2004, 103,000 soldiers, including women 
and children, were disarmed in camps around the 
country. Sven Torfinn/Panos Pictures
l Poor people tend to lack awareness of 
laws and their rights, making structures 
of public accountability useless in 
countries such as Bangladesh and 
Afghanistan.
l Holistic or integrated approaches 
such as the sustainable economic, 
community, political and livelihood 
development policies adopted in Sierra 
Leone have the best chance of success.
l Analysis of the needs of vulnerable 
groups, such as children, ethnic 
minorities, women and older people in 
Moldova have helped shape a number 
of new social and economic policies.
The research also found that the biggest 
challenge to implementing a human 
security approach in fragile conditions is 
the inability of donor agencies and national 
governments to adopt holistic strategies. 
What do you think?
Please write and tell us your views 
about the issues raised in id21 
insights. And what topics would you 
like to read about? 
Email insights@ids.ac.uk with your 
ideas. 
What is human security? 
’... safety from such chronic threats 
as hunger, disease, and repression 
and; protection from sudden and 
hurtful disruptions in the patterns of 
daily lives, whether in homes, jobs 
or communities’. 
UNDP Human Development Report, 1994
and cannot be solved by addressing any 
in isolation.
l In countries such as Latvia, East 
Timor, Mozambique, and Bangladesh, 
shortcomings in the delivery of basic 
social services such as healthcare, 
education, jobs and social security 
networks tend to rank as high as 
threats to individual and national 
security.
Strategies for securing peace that 
have worked in Afghanistan are 
unlikely to work in Iraq or Somalia. 
Yet, interventions by international 
organisations and countries in crisis 
areas continue to follow the same 
formula: first condemnation, then 
sanctions, then military action.
Military interventions in Somalia, 
Afghanistan and Iraq have failed to bring 
peace or prevent crises from spiralling out of 
control. Cleary, the international community 
needs a new framework for engagement in 
fragile situations.
To address this problem, the Human 
Security framework has been developed by 
academics and policymakers. At its core, 
human security prioritises an individual's 
fears and needs over that of a country or 
government.
A good description of human security 
can be found in the 1994 UNDP Human 
Development Report: ’safety from such 
chronic threats as hunger, disease, and 
repression; and protection from sudden 
and hurtful disruptions in the patterns 
of daily lives, whether in homes, jobs 
or communities’. This inter-connected 
multi-dimensional approach aims to build 
contextual and focussed policy responses to 
security threats.
Researchers from the Institute of 
Development Studies in the UK have 
analysed thirteen UNDP National Human 
Development Reports on human security. 
Findings include: 
l The causes of insecurity in the 
surveyed countries (including Latvia, 
Mozambique, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
and Sierra Leone) are a combination of 
social, political, and economic factors, 
The problem is aggravated by some who 
dismiss the human security approach as 
too vague and too closely linked to security 
rather than development. 
The surveys also show that people’s 
perceptions of insecurity affect their lives 
beyond most other considerations. Policies 
that bridge security and development, 
therefore, will best address the challenges 
faced in fragile states.
Recommendations for fragile states 
include:
l policy initiatives based on human 
security in fragile states need to be 
formulated on a case-by-case basis 
l policymakers in donor institutions and 
countries must focus on people-centred 
security and development policies
l new policies must be based on evidence 
gathered from comprehensive surveys 
and interviews of people living in 
insecure environments
l the new UN Peace Building 
Commission should base all its activities 
in fragile states on the principles 
of human security.
Deepayan Basu Ray
Oxford Policy Management,
6 St. Aldates Courtyard, 38 St. Aldates,  
Oxford OX1 1BN, UK 
T +44 (0)1865 207347
deepayan.basuray@opml.co.uk
 
Richard Jolly
Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 
Falmer BN1 9RE, UK 
T +44 (0)1273 606261    r.jolly@ids.ac.uk
See also
The Human Security Framework and National Human 
Development Reports: A Review of Experiences and 
Current Debate, HDRO Occasional Paper 5, Human 
Development Report Office, UNDP, by Richard Jolly and 
Deepayan Basu Ray, 2006 (PDF)
http://hdr.undp.org/docs/nhdr/thematic_reviews/
human_security_guidance_note.pdf
Human Development Report 1994, United Nations 
Development Programme, Oxford University Press:  
New York, 1994
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1994/en
Useful web links
Aid Effectiveness in Fragile States, DFID
http://tinyurl.com/2rpy5g
Chatham House
www.chathamhouse.org.uk 
Conflict and Security Resource Guide, ELDIS
www.eldis.org/conflict 
Conflict Prevention Pools, UK Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office
http://tinyurl.com/ytausa
Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP
www.undp.org/bcpr 
Conflict, Security and Development Research Programme, 
King’s College London
www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/sspp/ws/research/groups/csdrp
Crisis States Research Centre
www.crisisstates.com 
Democracy and Governance, USAID
www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance
Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford
www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/peace/tmp/centres 
Development Assistance Committee, OECD
www.oecd.org/dac 
Fragile States, the LICUS Initiative, World Bank
www.worldbank.org/licus 
Governance and Social Development Resource Centre
www.gsdrc.org 
IDS Governance Team
www.ids.ac.uk/ids/govern/index.html 
Institute for Security Studies, South Africa
www.iss.org.za 
International Conflict Research 
www.incore.ulst.ac.uk 
International Crisis Group
www.crisisgroup.org 
Joost Van Der Zwan
J.Van-Der-Zwan@lse.ac.uk 
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Good intentions do not 
prevent conflict
When we speak of the international community we think 
of states, the United Nations, development agencies, 
or non-government organisations. Yet other groups 
and individuals are often as relevant to development: 
multinational and local companies and private security 
firms. 
These groups, however, often fail to unite behind effective 
strategies for conflict prevention: reconciling positions, reaching 
compromise and securing consent are often difficult.
While states, multilateral organisations and NGOs claim to be 
struggling for peace, an end to poverty and for human rights, 
their actual strategies are not always helpful. Take the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda: the UN’s stock approach demanded a cease-
fire which would have immobilised the only source of protection 
for Tutsis from Hutu militias. 
The specific nature of individual situations needs to be studied, 
understood and respected. Kosovo is not like East Timor. 
Transposing strategies from Mozambique to Angola is unlikely to 
work. If the riskiest moments during crises are not recognised or 
understood – sharp economic decline or political transitions, for 
example – preventative strategies cannot work.
International actors have a shocking record of failure in conflict 
prevention – including the failure even to try. This is hardly 
surprising: the international media and large NGOs can only 
focus meaningfully on a few issues at once – generally those of 
greatest geographically strategic concern. They rarely focus on 
crises that actually or potentially cost the most lives.
The current focus includes Iran, North Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq, 
the Israel-Palestine-Lebanon situation and occasionally, Darfur. 
While discussions on Iran and North Korea are preventative, the 
others constitute full-blown crises. In Darfur, the problems have 
been known for some time and a peace agreement between 
several of the parties was reached in May 2006, but power 
politics (and local actors) have impeded its implementation. 
We now know that countries previously at war are most likely 
to experience conflict again. Yet East Timor was removed from 
the UN Security Council’s active agenda not long before serious 
rioting in early 2006 highlighted continuing instability. Other 
countries with experience of past conflicts continue to remain at 
acute risk.
Innovative preventative strategies occasionally break through. 
For instance, efforts by the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum 
successfully prompted the largest UN human rights monitoring 
mission, in Nepal in 2005. 
Prevention is important for countries immediately affected and 
for neighbouring states. Much of West Africa was affected by 
the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and beyond. The conflict 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo involved armies of six 
neighbouring states. Colombia’s conflict affected border areas of 
Peru and Ecuador.
Conflict prevention strategies can work but only with sustained 
attention and adequate resources. In addition, it is necessary to:
l tailor strategies to individual situations
l recognise the role of economic issues and actors in generating 
and sustaining conflict 
l have a long-term approach 
l be sensitive to regional factors.
David Malone
High Commissioner for India and Ambassador to Bhutan and Nepal, Government of 
Canada    David.Malone@international.gc.ca
These views are David Malone’s and not those of the Canadian Government
Dinka grandmothers and women with their children sit on a barge 
travelling up the River Nile, as it returns Dinka tribespeople from Juba to 
their homeland of Bor after the civil war. The resettlement programme 
is organised by the International Organisation for Migration and United 
Nations bodies. Thousands of Dinka tribespeople are among the estimated 
3.8 million people displaced during the 20-year conflict between the 
government and the Sudanese People Liberation Army.  
Sven Torfinn/Panos Pictures 2006
l Legacies of the recent past require 
more than law reform alone. Such 
legacies include: impunity and 
corruption (Cambodia), erosion of 
the rule of law (Iraq), and systematic 
dismantling of legal and judicial 
infrastructure (Afghanistan, Cambodia, 
Iraq). Aside from dealing with issues of 
transitional justice (including recovering 
truth and reconciliation), promoting the 
rule of law and an appreciation 
of the values of human rights can 
help confront such legacies.
l International Peace Accords 
need to have realistic 
expectations (unlike in Bosnia 
and Afghanistan) and a greater 
focus on equitable and just 
strategies rather than expediency 
(Iraq).
l Local ownership in constitution-
making processes is crucial 
to retain credibility and 
legitimacy as highlighted by the 
experiences in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.
The legitimacy of a state is 
determined by its performance 
in demonstrating and enforcing 
the rule of law and securing 
May 2007
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Rebuilding the  
revenue base for 
sustainable peace
The challenges of tax collection are 
formidable in low-income and post-war 
economies. War economies give rise 
to a wide range of illegal and informal 
economic activities beyond the control 
of the state. This makes tax collection in 
post-war states particularly difficult.
Taxation is one of the principal lenses for 
measuring state capacity, legitimacy and power 
relations in a society. Following the fiscal crises 
in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America in 
the 1990s, designing tax systems that provide 
incentives for growth, meet distributional 
demands, and increase revenue collection 
is central to state effectiveness. In post-war 
economies, rebuilding the revenue base is 
essential to reconstruct a viable state and 
sustained peace.
In policy circles, tax reform is often 
discussed in technical, non-political terms. 
This limits understanding of the political and 
institutional processes underlying the power 
and legitimacy a state requires to extract and 
mobilise resources.
Direct taxation
The World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund say: ‘don’t try difficult 
interventions and reforms at home’. They have 
promoted tax simplification and value-added 
taxes, which are supposedly easier to collect 
than income taxes and are more business-
friendly. Long-term strengthening of states, 
however, requires moving towards more direct 
and progressive income and property taxation. 
This is particularly the case in countries with 
very unequal income distribution.
The most prominent features of post-war 
economies are that the tax base is relatively low, 
dependent on trade taxes, and extremely narrow. 
‘Large’ payers contribute between 40 and 70 
percent of domestic revenue collection. The need 
to widen the coverage of the tax base is urgent 
in these countries.
Trade taxes
Dependence on trade taxes presents specific 
policy challenges. Trade liberalisation has led to 
reductions in trade taxes, the main source of 
revenue in low income states. Evidence presented 
by the International Monetary Fund shows that 
low income countries only recover 30 cents on 
each dollar lost from reducing taxes on trade.
Trade liberalisation can undermine tax capacity 
in low income and post-war economies. Indeed, 
the case against rapid tariff reduction as a means 
of maintaining and increasing fiscal resources 
– a key element in state consolidation and state-
building – is one of the main lessons in post-war 
reconstruction.
Taxation and legitimacy
Perceptions of fairness across groups and regions 
in taxation are central to improvements in 
revenue collection. If a tax is considered fair, the 
number of taxpayers that voluntarily pay their 
taxes increases. When large numbers of potential 
taxpayers evade or under-report their tax 
liabilities, the administrative costs of detecting 
and enforcing such cases increases the costs of 
collecting taxes substantially. 
A main goal of tax reform, therefore, is to 
increase the level of voluntary compliance. 
Although technical aspects of tax reform are 
crucial, more political analysis is needed if we are 
to understand how and why tax reforms become 
legitimate.
Jonathan Di John
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London, Russell Square, London WC1H 0XG, UK 
T +44 (0)207 898 4087    jd5@soas.ac.uk
Making justice 
sector reform 
work
The legal system and the judiciary 
have very important roles to play in 
maintaining or restoring legitimacy 
in fragile states. Injustice, deeply 
embedded in both the legal system and 
a partial or ineffective judicial system, 
tends to weaken state legitimacy and 
sometimes contributes to the eruption 
of armed conflict.
It is therefore hardly surprising that in post-
conflict situations, multilateral and bilateral 
development assistance places high priority 
on reforming legal and judicial systems. Yet, 
despite generous funding, progress has been 
slow and achievements few as experience in 
Bosnia and Afghanistan indicates.
Legitimacy – defined as ‘acceptance of 
the right to rule’ by the ruler and the ruled 
– requires a legal system based on two 
elements: the concept of the rule of law 
and access to a judicial process that solves 
disputes and resolves conflicts in a timely 
and visibly equitable manner.
Effective peace-building
Based on experience, peace-building 
in post-conflict situations requires the 
following elements to be effective:
l Appropriate models of legal systems 
are needed as: simplistic models 
implanted in Afghanistan and Timor 
Leste have failed.
l Multiple sources of legal pluralism such 
as traditional courts and customary 
law, and the role of internal institutions 
are essential for dispute resolution 
(Afghanistan, Iraq).
l Strong local human resources are 
crucial: lawyers and judges were 
extremely scarce in Cambodia and 
Timor Leste – bringing in international 
outsiders as an interim response 
failed to build either legitimacy or 
sustainability.
access to justice for everyone. Multilateral 
and bilateral development assistance must 
therefore prioritise reform of legal and 
judicial systems, and strive for greater 
effectiveness by:
l acknowledging legal pluralism and the 
complementary formal and informal 
legal systems that balance the internal 
and external responsibilities of states
l prioritising the development of local 
human resources including effective 
mentoring programmes 
l prioritising truth, justice and 
reconciliation in the provision of 
transitional justice and to overcome 
legacies of the past 
l facilitating constitution-making 
processes that are fully inclusive and 
participatory
l ensuring that principle prevails over 
expediency and impunity in all aspects 
of interim administration
l making conflict assessment and conflict 
prevention integral aspects of all 
development programming, especially 
those in the legal and justice sectors.
Clarence J. Dias
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A prison guard at the detention centre of the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone set up jointly by the government and the 
United Nations to investigate war crimes. This cell had been 
prepared for former Liberian president Charles Taylor, who 
was eventually transferred to the court in March 2006. He is 
to be tried for war crimes in Sierra Leone at the International 
Criminal Court in The Hague. Sven Torfinn/Panos Pictures 2005
2007. An estimated 340,000 people fled 
fighting in Mogadishu in the following 
months. In April 2007, heavy fighting 
occurred in the capital. Somaliland, which 
declared independence from Somalia in 
1991, has achieved remarkable internal 
stability. A new system of governance that 
draws heavily on the traditional ‘elders’ 
system has enabled:
l the restoration of public security and 
order
l local, presidential and parliamentary 
elections
l the establishment of administrative 
structures
l economic reconstruction – supported 
substantially by the Diaspora.
Afghanistan 
Afghanistan remains delicately balanced 
five years after the fall of the Taliban. 
While full-scale insurgency by the Taliban 
is underway in the south, a multitude 
of warlords still dominate the north. In 
the southern province of Paktia, tribal 
strength guarantees some degree of 
security for the local population; tribal 
order demarcates social interactions. The 
presence of foreigners, either from Kabul 
or outside Afghanistan, is sometimes 
considered an open provocation with 
serious consequences for legitimacy of the 
state. However, in the northern province of 
Kunduz, warlords co-exist peacefully with 
the state and the international community 
– so long as their influence and economic 
base is not threatened. 
What are the policy implications?
l Local elites gain legitimacy through 
social customs and traditions. This 
restrains their freedom of action and 
in turn creates expectations amongst 
their constituencies. External groups 
– be they international organisations 
or international NGOs – should 
be thorough in their search for 
appropriate partners and institutions to 
cooperate with. ‘Short cuts’ providing 
support to strongmen and warlords 
make it more difficult for communities 
to control their leaders.
l Re-vitalised traditional institutions have 
been a powerful tool in addressing 
‘warlordism’. The governance potential 
of traditional institutions is however 
limited to their own reference groups: 
their underlying values may challenge 
‘western’ norms. Development policy 
has to engage in new forms of co-
operation; bridging the gap between 
traditional and newer forms of 
authority is crucial. Giving those 
involved locally clearly defined roles 
whilst simultaneously allowing modern 
state institutions to enforce minimal 
standards on the rule of law will also 
help.
In culturally homogeneous communities 
(Paktia, parts of Somaliland), respected local 
institutions minimise the possibilities for 
individuals to profit from illicit economic 
activities, including exploiting natural 
resources or trading in drugs. Culturally 
varied communities seem more prone to 
strongmen and warlords (Kunduz) who 
promote their own interests through 
violence and illicit incomes. 
Conclusions
Instead of fighting these economies of 
violence, development and security policy 
should support local institutions which are 
seen as legitimate and can bring these illicit 
activities under social control. Promising 
examples of this approach include: 
l supporting Somaliland’s parliamentary 
system which is amalgamated with a 
national Council of Elders (guurti)
l active involvement of local institutions 
such as the Tribal Liaison Office in 
Paktia, Afghanistan. 
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Since the attacks on the USA on 
September 11th 2001, the weakening 
and re-building of states has ranked high 
on the political and research agenda. 
Mainstream models of state-building assume 
that state legitimacy can be established and 
collapse avoided through:
l international intervention and military 
presence
l huge amounts of aid
l democratic local elections
However, realities on the ground are 
different. External interventions rarely work. 
International organisations, military actors, 
bilateral donors, and international NGOs are 
insufficiently or not at all prepared to engage 
in the complex process of bargaining (with 
war lords or tribal authorities for example). 
Neither are they prepared to engage in 
power relations (between the centre and the 
provinces or between parliament, the courts 
and political parties for example) or in re-
building war-torn societies.
Research at the Center for Development 
Research at Bonn University and the Institute 
for Development and Peace at the University 
of Duisburg-Essen in Germany has focussed 
on local and national governance and power 
structures. In two provinces of Afghanistan 
(Kunduz and Paktia) and Somaliland 
(Awdal and Sanaag), a number of groups 
and individuals took over when the state 
collapsed. These included military faction 
leaders and ‘warlords’, former civil servants, 
tribal authorities, religious courts and local 
businessmen. 
Somalia
Somalia remains fragmented. Backed by the 
Ethiopian military, transitional government 
troops quickly took territory previously held 
by the Union of Islamic Courts in January 
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Strong but fragile 
Horizontal inequalities in Indonesia
Today, most of the international 
community sees Indonesia as a ‘fragile’ 
state, with a recent history of violent 
conflict and a poor record of access to 
government services.
In the early 1990s, commentators on 
Indonesia often expressed a grudging 
admiration for the New Order regime of 
President Suharto. In power since 1965, he 
kept tight political control while achieving 
significant economic growth. The July 1997 
currency crisis, however, undermined the 
entire regime.
The outbreak of violence after 1998 was 
largely linked to policies which contributed 
to social exclusion and created ‘horizontal’ 
inequalities between various ethnic 
communities. Under the transmigration 
programme, for example, thousands of 
families were relocated from Java and 
Bali to the ‘Outer Islands’, where political 
resistance and sporadic rebellion had 
existed since the early years of Indonesia’s 
independence. 
Although the transmigration programme 
was meant to relieve population pressures 
in Java, it was also a means of providing 
‘loyal’ Javanese support for the territorial 
units of the armed forces. These migrants 
were often allocated prime agricultural 
land, sometimes displacing local people. 
The graph above shows the relative 
proportion of local people and migrants 
in the agricultural sector according to 
land-holding size (calculated from a 
sample of the 1990 census). It shows that 
Java/Bali born agriculturalists were heavily 
concentrated in the larger land holdings.
When the regime collapsed in 1998, 
the country experienced many forms of 
fragility: access to government services 
declined sharply and state legitimacy 
suffered. But key to the ethno-communal 
violence were tensions between migrant 
and local communities, often made worse 
by religious differences. Econometric 
analysis shows that the communal violence 
was more intense in areas with higher 
horizontal inequalities. In this case, the 
transmigration process led to state fragility 
by contributing to the conditions for ethno-
communal conflict.
Indonesia’s 
experience under 
Suharto is similar to 
the ‘strong’ state 
in pre-revolutionary 
France, which was 
able to withstand 
social pressures for 
an extended period. 
When it eventually 
gave way, the built 
up tensions resulted 
in revolution. 
In a similar way, 
with its military 
strength, Suharto’s 
regime was able 
to suppress social 
and communal 
discontent over 
exclusion and 
inequalities. When 
the regime finally collapsed, all the 
destructive social forces built up during 
this period were unleashed: the New Order 
was a fragile regime.
An important lesson from Indonesia’s 
experience is the inter-connectedness of 
the various dimensions of state fragility. 
In Aceh and East Timor, for example, a 
vicious cycle developed:
l poor and exclusionary service delivery, 
creating horizontal inequalities along 
regional and ethnic lines
l declining / absent state legitimacy
l challenges to state 
authority
l military responses, 
which reinforced local 
perceptions of the 
illegitimacy of the 
regime
l further undermining of 
access to government 
services.
A final conclusion from the 
Indonesian case emphasises 
the importance of horizontal 
inequalities as a driver of 
state fragility. Even when 
overall service delivery 
is good, sub-national 
inequalities and exclusionary 
practices across communal 
or regional groups can 
ultimately undermine the 
legitimacy and authority of 
the state.
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Members of the Kosovo Protection Corps attend a ceremony 
in Pristina, Kosovo. The Kosovo Protection Corps, formed 
from the ranks of the rebel Kosovo Liberation Army, will be 
disbanded under the independence plans for Kosovo and its 
soldiers retrained. Since the end of the Kosovo war in 1999, the 
territory has been under the jurisdiction of the United Nations, 
although technically still a province of Serbia. Asked by the 
UN to work on a solution for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari (former 
President of Finland) says: ‘... the only viable option for Kosovo 
is independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the 
international community’. Andrew Testa/Panos Pictures 2007
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